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Soosh

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When I walk away from my R1T, I sometimes think "is this gonna be here when I get back?" I keep seeing how this car or that car (currently Camaros) are having their access means being cloned by criminals. Besides The Club is there an Anti-Theft device on the market that is being used by other Rivian owners?
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MtnRiv

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Rivians are pretty heavy in the software arena. I’m sure some criminal genius will find a way to hack it and clone a fob, but that usually requires a proximity link to a fob in use to clone. Since most of us use our phones, it is less likely a criminal would be able to get access to a fob. The phones use encryption and need to handshake with the car to access. OTA exploit of an incripted signal is far less likely than a fob sending a signal that could be captured and duplicated.

Did that sound smart? I hope so, because I really don’t know what the F I’m talking about???. Now my car is going to get stolen…
 

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Oh that reminds me to get a faraday bag for the key fob. I always end up taking the key fob despite also having my phone with me
 

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It's called pin to drive. Tesla has had it for years and I'm very surprised rivian hasn't implemented this yet.

Think of PTD as a second factor of authentication. You can have the key card, fob, or phone key signal but you need to have that and also the pin from the driver in order to drive away with the vehicle.

The lack of PTD is a major omission by rivian.
 

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is there an Anti-Theft device on the market that is being used by other Rivian owners? Yes, it's called Phone As A Key, and you have it.

As long as you are using your Phone As A Key (PAAK) there is nothing to worry about at all - until car thieves have handheld quantum computers, lol. Rivian is a member of the Connected Car Consortium. The tech is light years ahead of RF (Radio Frequency) Fobs. It uses private/public key encryption to communicate, conceptually similar to how secure web sites work. It prevents relay attacks by measuring the "time of flight" - how long it takes for the car and the phone to "handshake". You can read more about the details here if you like. SOmeone stealing your Rivian by hacking PAAK should be at the very bottom of your concerns, well below "What am I having for lunch today?".

"CCC Digital Key enables hands-free passive keyless entry at the same level of comfort and safety as classic hands-free passive entry and passive start, provided by a large number of vehicle models today. CCC Digital Key may be used to access a vehicle, start the engine, immobilize the vehicle, or authorize any other operation. No interaction with the mobile device is needed, for example activating an app. The smartphone can stay in the user’s pocket. To provide hands-free access, the mobile device and vehicle mutually authenticate, and the vehicle verifies that the mobile device’s CCC Digital Key authorizes the requested operation. UWB time-of-flight measurement prevents attackers from using relay attacks (based on signal amplification) to trick the vehicle into thinking that the mobile device is nearby when it is not – this protection is called ‘secure ranging’. Alternatively, CCC Digital Key may be used by simply placing a mobile device near the vehicle’s NFC reader. The limited operational range of NFC prevents attackers from fooling the car into thinking the device is closer than it is. Both the UWB – BLE combination and NFC utilize the authentication protocol’s privacy to ensure that anyone monitoring wireless communications cannot track the user or their mobile device."
 

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Notwithstanding, for someone to 'target' Rivians, there'd need to be a black market.

With how connected the vehicle is and is *required to be* in order to simply function, these vehicles would be useless. Even stripped for parts, where are criminals going to sell them that's not going to raise a ton of red flags and shut down their operation poste haste?

I don't think there's much risk for modern vehicle theft given the ease of tracking the heck out of it, finding it, and getting the authorities involved (notwithstanding, I'd bet Rivian could shut these down remotely if need). I'm less worried about my Rivian than I was for the Subaru STi I drove previously, for sure.
 

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1. It’s why you have and pay for insurance
2. Even if they could gain entry, they’d have to dupe your digital keys to operate
3. Know how much data your R is sending to the mothership? Including vehicle location, which you can see with your app?
4. Thieves target and strip cars that have large market share. The large market share mean stolen parts are easy and fast to sell. The R1 is low volume and does not qualify.
5. If we all insist on brand new replacement parts, there’d be no demand for reconditioned/stolen parts.
6. Smash and grabs are much more likely. Leave nothing in plain sight while unattended. Your interior should look like the very first time you saw it—nothing but original equipment.
7. Want to protect yourself better? think like a thief. "What's in that bag? Laptop? Tablet? Wallet?" "Is that phone cord? Maybe the phone is in the center console?". "What's in that stack of mail? New credit card? Personal info?" Y'know? Common sense.
 
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Ironcitijc

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It's called pin to drive. Tesla has had it for years and I'm very surprised rivian hasn't implemented this yet.

Think of PTD as a second factor of authentication. You can have the key card, fob, or phone key signal but you need to have that and also the pin from the driver in order to drive away with the vehicle.

The lack of PTD is a major omission by rivian.
I agree. I’m still very surprised Rivian hasn’t added this in any OTA’s yet. It’s very easy to use and for those who don’t want to use it you can simply toggle it off.
 

R1Thor

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I agree. I’m still very surprised Rivian hasn’t added this in any OTA’s yet. It’s very easy to use and for those who don’t want to use it you can simply toggle it off.
Because it's seriously overkill and completely unnecessary?
 

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is there an Anti-Theft device on the market that is being used by other Rivian owners? Yes, it's called Phone As A Key, and you have it.

As long as you are using your Phone As A Key (PAAK) there is nothing to worry about at all - until car thieves have handheld quantum computers, lol. Rivian is a member of the Connected Car Consortium. The tech is light years ahead of RF (Radio Frequency) Fobs. It uses private/public key encryption to communicate, conceptually similar to how secure web sites work. It prevents relay attacks by measuring the "time of flight" - how long it takes for the car and the phone to "handshake". You can read more about the details here if you like. SOmeone stealing your Rivian by hacking PAAK should be at the very bottom of your concerns, well below "What am I having for lunch today?".

"CCC Digital Key enables hands-free passive keyless entry at the same level of comfort and safety as classic hands-free passive entry and passive start, provided by a large number of vehicle models today. CCC Digital Key may be used to access a vehicle, start the engine, immobilize the vehicle, or authorize any other operation. No interaction with the mobile device is needed, for example activating an app. The smartphone can stay in the user’s pocket. To provide hands-free access, the mobile device and vehicle mutually authenticate, and the vehicle verifies that the mobile device’s CCC Digital Key authorizes the requested operation. UWB time-of-flight measurement prevents attackers from using relay attacks (based on signal amplification) to trick the vehicle into thinking that the mobile device is nearby when it is not – this protection is called ‘secure ranging’. Alternatively, CCC Digital Key may be used by simply placing a mobile device near the vehicle’s NFC reader. The limited operational range of NFC prevents attackers from fooling the car into thinking the device is closer than it is. Both the UWB – BLE combination and NFC utilize the authentication protocol’s privacy to ensure that anyone monitoring wireless communications cannot track the user or their mobile device."
I'm fairly certain the hardware in current R1s does not support UWB. It's possible that the EDV does since the fob only acts on the door the driver is standing in front of. I would imagine that UWB will be included in the R1 refresh and R2/3 as it would really help all the PaaK issues we all have since it would enable proper distance estimation between transmitter and receiver.
 

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godfodder0901

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Rivians are pretty heavy in the software arena. I’m sure some criminal genius will find a way to hack it and clone a fob, but that usually requires a proximity link to a fob in use to clone. Since most of us use our phones, it is less likely a criminal would be able to get access to a fob. The phones use encryption and need to handshake with the car to access. OTA exploit of an incripted signal is far less likely than a fob sending a signal that could be captured and duplicated.

Did that sound smart? I hope so, because I really don’t know what the F I’m talking about???. Now my car is going to get stolen…
The main error in your statement is the assumption that an attacker needs to break the encryption. For a passive relay attack, this is neither required nor desired. An attacker simply needs to amplify the genuine, authentic transmissions from the vehicle and key. The other error is assuming that PaaK is somehow more secure in it's current implementation than the FOB. Both currently use the same BLE protocols and 'handshakes'. I suspect if you captured the exchange from both devices, you would see that they are very similar, if not identical.
is there an Anti-Theft device on the market that is being used by other Rivian owners? Yes, it's called Phone As A Key, and you have it.

As long as you are using your Phone As A Key (PAAK) there is nothing to worry about at all - until car thieves have handheld quantum computers, lol. Rivian is a member of the Connected Car Consortium. The tech is light years ahead of RF (Radio Frequency) Fobs. It uses private/public key encryption to communicate, conceptually similar to how secure web sites work. It prevents relay attacks by measuring the "time of flight" - how long it takes for the car and the phone to "handshake". You can read more about the details here if you like. SOmeone stealing your Rivian by hacking PAAK should be at the very bottom of your concerns, well below "What am I having for lunch today?".

"CCC Digital Key enables hands-free passive keyless entry at the same level of comfort and safety as classic hands-free passive entry and passive start, provided by a large number of vehicle models today. CCC Digital Key may be used to access a vehicle, start the engine, immobilize the vehicle, or authorize any other operation. No interaction with the mobile device is needed, for example activating an app. The smartphone can stay in the user’s pocket. To provide hands-free access, the mobile device and vehicle mutually authenticate, and the vehicle verifies that the mobile device’s CCC Digital Key authorizes the requested operation. UWB time-of-flight measurement prevents attackers from using relay attacks (based on signal amplification) to trick the vehicle into thinking that the mobile device is nearby when it is not – this protection is called ‘secure ranging’. Alternatively, CCC Digital Key may be used by simply placing a mobile device near the vehicle’s NFC reader. The limited operational range of NFC prevents attackers from fooling the car into thinking the device is closer than it is. Both the UWB – BLE combination and NFC utilize the authentication protocol’s privacy to ensure that anyone monitoring wireless communications cannot track the user or their mobile device."
A few points of clarity:
1. Rivian's implementation does not incorporate UWB, or any security enhancements brought with it. BLE does not natively support time-of-flight as the protocol is inherently laggy (milliseconds) when compared to UWB (nanoseconds).
2. Rivian FOBs use BLE, just like PaaK.
3. PKI/asymmetric encryption has no impact on an attackers ability to execute passive relay attacks. They are not trying to read or modify the data; they only want to amplify the signal. This is logically similar to adding a larger, higher gain antenna. Encryption doesn't help when the goal is to propagate an authentic, genuine signal.
 

godfodder0901

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No, it isn't. It is very much necessary.
D'oh, you're totally right!

I forgot all of those news articles that just came out about all of the stolen Rivians!

I think this is textbook fearmongering. Compared to every other vehicle on the road, these vehicles are, in totality, statistically insignificant in terms of risk from theft.
 

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The main error in your statement is the assumption that an attacker needs to break the encryption. For a passive relay attack, this is neither required nor desired. An attacker simply needs to amplify the genuine, authentic transmissions from the vehicle and key. The other error is assuming that PaaK is somehow more secure in it's current implementation than the FOB. Both currently use the same BLE protocols and 'handshakes'. I suspect if you captured the exchange from both devices, you would see that they are very similar, if not identical.

A few points of clarity:
1. Rivian's implementation does not incorporate UWB, or any security enhancements brought with it. BLE does not natively support time-of-flight as the protocol is inherently laggy (milliseconds) when compared to UWB (nanoseconds).
2. Rivian FOBs use BLE, just like PaaK.
3. PKI/asymmetric encryption has no impact on an attackers ability to execute passive relay attacks. They are not trying to read or modify the data; they only want to amplify the signal. This is logically similar to adding a larger, higher gain antenna. Encryption doesn't help when the goal is to propagate an authentic, genuine signal.
Hence why I stated “I don’t know what the F I’m talking about”, haha. Thanks for clarifying!
 

godfodder0901

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D'oh, you're totally right!

I forgot all of those news articles that just came out about all of the stolen Rivians!

I think this is textbook fearmongering. Compared to every other vehicle on the road, these vehicles are, in totality, statistically insignificant in terms of risk from theft.
It's not fear mongering. There is a reason than Pin-to-Drive exists; there is a need. Rivians are not inherently more secure than any other vehicle modern out there, there simply aren't as many of them on the road to steal. It's just a matter of time before it happens (if it hasn't already), and Pin-to-Drive is a relatively low-lift solution to a problem that does exist.
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